Given the bleak prospects for a global agreement on coordinated policies to mitigate climate change, political pressure is increasing among industrialized countries for unilateral abatement. A major challenge thereby is the appropriate response to the threat of emissions leakage. Border carbon adjustments and output-based allocation of emissions allowances can increase effectiveness of unilateral action but introduce distortions of their own. We assess the relative attractiveness of these anti-leakage measures as a function of the abatement coalition size. We first develop a partial equilibrium analytical framework to gain generic insights on how these instruments affect emissions within and outside the coalition. We then employ a large-scale computable general equilibrium model of international trade and energy use to assess the cost-effectiveness of alternative anti-leakage strategies as the coalition evolves toward global coverage. We find that full border adjustments rank first in global cost-effectiveness, followed by import tariffs and then output-based rebates. The differences across anti-leakage measures and the overall appeal of such measures decline with the size of the abatement coalition. In terms of cost incidence, the abatement coalition prefers border carbon adjustments over output-based rebates; the opposite holds true for countries outside the coalition.
Introduction
At the 16th Conference of the Parties in Cancún, the world community agreed on the objective of limiting the rise in global average temperature to no more than 2° Celsius above pre-industrial levels to prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system.
The target implies drastic global emissions reductions over the next decades of roughly 50 percent compared to 1990 levels (IPCC 2007) . Given the increasing share of the developing world in global anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions, the 2° Celsius target cannot be achieved without substantial abatement contributions from major developing regions, such as China or India. At the same time, because high-income industrialized countries historically had (and still have) much higher per-capita emissions than low-income developing countries, it seems inevitable that industrialized countries take a leading role in short-to mid-run abatement efforts before the developing countries will follow suit.
The increasing pressure for unilateral action manifests itself in various domestic climate policy initiatives by industrialized countries. Most notable is the European Union's Climate Action and Renewable Energy Package, which calls for unilateral greenhouse gas A major challenge in the design of unilateral climate policies is the appropriate response to the threat of emissions leakage-that is, the increase in emissions in nonabating regions as a reaction to the reduction of emissions in abating regions (e.g., Hoel 1991; Felder and Rutherford 1993) . Emissions leakage can occur when energy-intensive, trade-exposed * Böhringer (boehringer@uni-oldenburg.de) is a professor and holds the Chair of Economic Policy in the Department of Economics at the University of Oldenburg. Fischer (fischer@rff.org) is a senior fellow at Resources for the Future, 1616 P Street, Washington DC, 20036. Rosendahl (knut.einar.rosendahl@ssb.no ) is a senior research fellow at Statistics Norway in Oslo. Böhringer, Fischer, and Rosendahl 2 (EITE) industries in countries with emissions ceilings lose competitiveness, thereby increasing emissions-intensive production in unconstrained regions. Leakage also occurs when emissions constraints in larger open economies depress the demand for fossil fuels and thus induce a significant drop in world energy prices, which in turn could lead to an increase in the level of energy demand in other regions.
To reduce leakage and thereby increase cost-effectiveness, various instruments are considered to complement unilateral emissions pricing. One policy measure is based on border carbon adjustments. On the import side, a tariff is levied on the embodied carbon of energy-intensive imports from nonabating regions assessed at the prevailing carbon price. On the export side, energy-intensive exports to nonabating countries get a full refund of carbon payments at the point of shipment. Full border adjustment would combine adjustments for imports and exports, effectively implementing destination-based carbon pricing (Whalley and Lockwood 2010) . However, most policy proposals to date focus only on import adjustments.
Another option is output-based rebates (under a fixed carbon price) or allocation of emissions allowances (under a fixed quota) to EITE sectors. The rebate, or the value of additional allowances, functions as a subsidy to production (Böhringer et al. 1998) . In this way, eligible sectors preserve competitiveness compared to unregulated industries abroad, thereby reducing leakage.
Border carbon adjustments and output-based rebates introduce distortions of their own but may be justified on efficiency grounds as second-best measures complementing unilateral emissions pricing. The attractiveness of these additional measures and their relative ranking in terms of global cost-effectiveness hinge on the magnitude of emissions leakage: the environmental effectiveness of output-based rebates and border carbon adjustments would drop to zero if the coalition of abating countries comprised the whole world. Whereas border carbon adjustments in this case would automatically become inactive, output-based rebates to energy-intensive industries might continue to induce excess costs of emissions abatement compared to the first-best option of uniform emissions pricing alone.
Beyond the global cost-effectiveness dimension, abating countries may face quite different cost and emissions implications of anti-leakage instruments based on their specific trade, production, and consumption patterns (Fischer and Fox 2009; ).
This immediately raises the question if individual countries joining some abatement coalition would easily agree on an anti-leakage strategy. Böhringer, Fischer, and Rosendahl 3 While the economic impacts of border adjustment measures and output-based rebates have been addressed for a fixed number of abating regions, we are not aware of any study that assesses the implications of these anti-leakage instruments as a function of the abatement coalition size toward more comprehensive coverage of global emissions. In this paper, we first develop a partial equilibrium analytical framework to gain generic insights on how three alternative anti-leakage instruments -output-based rebates, border adjustments for imports, and full border adjustment -affect emissions inside and outside the abatement coalition as it increases in size. We then perform numerical simulations using a large-scale computable general equilibrium (CGE) model of international trade and energy use to quantify the differential cost implications across the three strategies in an empirical setting.
We find that of the three instruments, full border adjustments are the most effective to reduce leakage. In theory, output-based rebates can be more effective than import adjustments alone when goods are stronger substitutes and the coalition size is sufficiently small. However, the parameterization of our CGE model with empirical data finds a robust ranking: In terms of global cost-effectiveness (being agnostic on the regional distribution of costs), unilateral action achieves a given worldwide emissions reduction at lowest cost with full border adjustment, but the cost advantage vis-à-vis tariffs is small. The relative performance between these two instruments remains robust as the coalition size increases.
Output-based rebates achieve the smallest cost savings among the three anti-leakage instruments compared to a reference climate policy that places a uniform price on carbon without additional leakage measures. Furthermore, they induce excess costs as the coalition size increases toward full coverage because the distortions of output subsidies prevail, while the anti-leakage effect becomes zero.
Depending on the trade characteristics of the coalition, it might prefer import tariffs over full border adjustments to increase the coalition's indirect welfare gains from terms-oftrade shifts. This ranking reverses if we take the complementary perspective of countries outside the abatement coalition. The latter clearly prefer output-based rebates over full border adjustments or tariffs. Output-based rebates induce economic implications that are more similar to those triggered by unilateral climate policies without anti-leakage instruments.
While they might be least controversial in the international policy debate, they also are the least cost-effective from a global perspective. Böhringer, Fischer, and Rosendahl 4 
Theoretical Considerations
We develop a simple partial equilibrium framework to illustrate important economic mechanisms that drive emissions leakage for alternative unilateral climate policies. The main driver is the change in the pricing of emissions inside and outside the abatement coalition.
Another important leakage determinant is the responsiveness to differential emissions pricing captured through own-price and cross-price elasticities in demand.
Analytical Model
Let there be n countries, each producing one good. Demand ik q in country i for the good produced in country k exhibits constant elasticities with respect to prices ij p prevailing in country i for good j, where the elasticities are ikj η for country i consuming good k with respect to the price of the good from country j:
where ik a denotes benchmark demand as initial prices are normalized to unity.
Suppose countries are symmetric, so benchmark demands are equal (a ik = a), as are own-price elasticities ( ikk o η η = − ), and cross-price elasticities ( ikj
Now we will distinguish between two country types: a regulating country M within the coalition, and a nonregulating country N outside the abatement coalition. Thus, we have symmetric prices for exchanges among identical country types, but prices will differ across those types. Let there be m countries of type M and hence (n-m) countries of type N.
Simplifying demand, we get:
( 1) ( )
( 1) ( ) Marginal production costs increase as the emissions intensity decreases from µ 0 , i.e., c′ < 0. The emissions intensity of production in country i is noted for brevity as µ i , and emissions in country i are denoted with E i . Global emissions are then:
The following lemma and assumption will be useful in the subsequent analysis:
Lemma 1: Given any carbon price, t> 0,
This follows by the definitions of ( ) t μ and c(µ)above (and 0 1 p = ); as carbon prices are imposed, producers in regulated countries respond by decreasing their emissions intensity to lower compliance costs. 
Leakage Metrics
Fundamentally, the problem of carbon leakage relates to the extent noncoalition emissions increase as a result of coalition actions, or 1 Assumption 1 is a sufficient, but not necessary, condition for clear comparisons. Böhringer, Fischer, and Rosendahl 6 Conventionally, the leakage rate is defined as the absolute increase in noncoalition emissions relative to the reduction of coalition emissions. Formally, we can write this leakage variable, L 1 , in terms of the emissions ratios we just referred to:
We also consider an alternative leakage variable, L 2 , which is particularly relevant in the case with a fixed global cap on emissions. L 2 indicates the relative burden of the coalition members vis-à-vis noncoalition members in reaching the emissions target-or the relative benefit to a nonmember country of staying outside the coalition. It measures the emissions ratio of the noncoalition countries relative to the emissions ratio of the coalition countries, and we will refer to it as the emissions differential:
In our analytical model, L 2 is simplified by the fact that baseline emissions are
Both measures increase as emissions outside the abatement coalition increase.
However, whereas the leakage rate L 1 increases with coalition emissions, the emissions differential L 2 increases when the coalition reduces its emissions. The two variables also differ in their responsiveness to changes in coalition membership: all else equal, L 1 decreases as the coalition grows, while the coalition size does not directly affect L 2 , which rather expresses average emissions differentials between members and nonmembers.
Both metrics are useful indicators of leakage problems, and in the numerical section, we will present results for L 1 and L 2 when relevant. For the purposes of this section, L 2 has the benefit of being more analytically tractable. However, we note that in the case of meeting a common coalition cap, for both of these leakage metrics, comparing policies boils down to simply comparing noncoalition emissions in each scenario. 2 Furthermore, we show that policies with lower noncoalition emissions in the context of a fixed coalition cap also must 2 Comparing policy g to h,
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Regulatory Measures
For our assessment of anti-leakage measures, we start with a reference climate policy in which the abatement coalition implements a carbon price through an emission tax (or quota) without additional anti-leakage measures. We then investigate how the addition of alternative anti-leakage measures-output-based rebates, border adjustments for imports, or full border adjustments-affect production and emissions inside and outside the abatement coalition for three different variants in which the carbon price, coalition emissions, or global emissions are fixed at the reference level. The latter two variants are useful in analyzing the environmental effectiveness from a coalition view or a global perspective-both require the carbon price to adjust accordingly from the initial reference level.
Carbon Price Alone
First consider a carbon price, implemented via a carbon tax or a quota market, without any anti-leakage policy (Tax, denoted as T). In this reference case, producers of goods in Simplifying our expressions for output from coalition and noncoalition countries: Böhringer, Fischer, and Rosendahl
Thus, carbon pricing reduces emissions in the coalition countries by reducing emissions intensity and output, while it expands emissions in the nonparticipating countries by expanding output. The size of the coalition (m) strengthens the expansion of emissions in the remaining countries, as does the size of the cross-price elasticity (substitutability) of the goods (η x ). These same factors weaken the emissions reductions within the coalition, given a fixed carbon price. As the coalition size grows, so do global emissions reductions. As a result, the overall leakage rate shrinks, but for a given carbon price, the emission differential is unaffected by the coalition size:
Carbon Price with OutputBased Rebate
With output-based rebating (OBR, denoted as R), the prices of goods produced in coalition countries do not include the cost of the remaining embodied emissions, but the emissions intensities (and corresponding production costs) respond to the emissions price signal. As a result, p MM = p NM = c R , where c R = c(µ R ) and µ R =µ(t R ), while p MN = p NN = c 0 = 1.
Simplifying output:
( 1)
Here we make the aforementioned distinction as to whether the rebating policy accompanies a fixed tax (denoted with superscript Rtax) or a fixed cap (denoted with superscript Rcap). In the case of a rebated tax, the emissions price t is unchanged compared to the reference case, so c R =c(µ(t)) = c T . Thus, noncoalition emissions are smaller ( 
1;
1. , Fischer, and Rosendahl 9 Given this result, the emission differential L 2 is necessarily smaller with OBR, but the net effect of rebating on global emissions can be ambiguous. Meanwhile, both emissions ratios above are decreasing in m, meaning that an increase in the coalition size tends to lower emissions under rebating relative to the reference case for participating and nonparticipating countries. Note that the emissions differential is insensitive to the coalition size m (in the fixed price case).
Turning to the case with a fixed coalition cap, the equilibrium price and emissions intensity will adjust under OBR to meet the same emissions target as for Tax, such that
Proposition 1:
Proof: Suppose that the rebate is implemented with a fixed cap, as with output-based allocation of emissions allowances. Because output is higher than with a carbon price alone, to meet the same target, emissions intensity must be lower ( R T μ μ < ), implying that
c c c tμ < < + .Then we can show:
In other words, rebating mitigates emissions leakage, and the magnitude of that effect increases with the cross-price elasticity and the coalition size, which together determine the cross-price pressure in those remaining countries. 3
Now suppose the rebate is implemented with a policy that is adjusted to meet the same global emissions target as the carbon price alone-i.e., the policy sets R μ such that
It then follows from Lemma 3 that the emissions differential will be lower under OBR. The intuition is that since noncoalition emissions are smaller under OBR for a given coalition cap, the carbon price with OBR can adjust downward to loosen the coalition cap and Simplifying the production expressions: show that noncoalition emissions fall while coalition emissions rise:
Btax T L L < ), but the net effect on global emissions is ambiguous. Nor can the effect of import adjustments on noncoalition and coalition emissions (and therefore the emissions differential) be easily compared to those under rebating.
(
Because coalition emissions rise with the import adjustment given a fixed carbon price, the carbon price would have to rise for the case of a fixed coalition cap (i.e., B t t > , so
The result is both a higher tax on imports from noncoalition countries and more price pressure in those countries to substitute away from goods made in coalition countries. In this case, the increase in carbon price mitigates the decrease in noncoalition emissions under a fixed tax (see above), with an ambiguous net effect on the emissions differential ratio:
It can be shown, however, that if global emissions decrease when a fixed carbon price is combined with border adjustments for imports, the first component dominates the second: leakage is necessarily reduced when a fixed coalition cap is combined with border adjustments. The intuition is that noncoalition countries' emissions do not increase more than the emissions reduction in the coalition countries when the carbon price is increased to t B in order to comply with the cap.
The size of the coalition can have ambiguous effects on this leakage ratio: it shrinks the first component because exports from the remaining noncoalition countries will be taxed more heavily by coalition countries, but it expands the second component because a larger share of the competing goods from coalition countries have higher costs. This latter effect is even stronger when compared to the OBR scheme because R T T c c tμ < + . Thus, it is difficult to rank these two policies in terms of their effectiveness in reducing leakage. However, we see that border adjustment for imports is more likely to increase leakage at higher cross-price elasticities (which raise the second term and brings the first closer to 1) and smaller coalition sizes (which bring the first term closer to 1 more rapidly than the second term). The degree of carbon price adjustment also factors in and is endogenous to these other variables.
We conclude that it is difficult to rank BAI vis-à-vis both carbon price alone (Tax) and OBR when it comes to leakage. From Lemma 3, we know that this ambiguity carries over to the case with a fixed global cap. Substituting into the production formula and simplifying with our normalization, we get: As we compare FBA to Tax and BAI for the variant of a fixed carbon price-i.e., t F = t-we obtain: 5
Thus, with a fixed carbon price, FBA has a stronger effect than BAI and Tax in terms of deterring leakage as well as repatriating output and emissions ( 2
The following proposition compares FBA with OBR, saying in particular that the emission differential is unambiguously smaller under FBA:
Proof: We prove i) by using ( ) t φ as defined in Assumption 1b, showing that full border adjustment yields unambiguously lower emissions than rebating in countries outside the coalition:
We notice that this result gets stronger as the coalition size gets larger.
To prove ii), we first compare the effects on coalition emissions:
5 Remember that emission intensities are the same across policies when the carbon price is fixed.
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Thus, emissions in coalition countries can be higher or lower with FBA than OBR, depending on the relative effects of the import adjustments versus the rebate to domestically consumed production (exported production is rebated under OBR and FBA).
Turning to the emissions differential L 2 , by Lemma 1 we have:
Next, we compare FBA to OBR and Tax with the same coalition cap. Given that with the same carbon price, border adjustments raise coalition emissions compared to import adjustment, to meet the same coalition cap, the FBA carbon price would have to rise ( F B t t t > > ), but the export price would still be less than under the carbon price alone. The net result is an unambiguous reduction in leakage compared to the Tax case.
Proof: Using Assumption 1b,
Furthermore, the size of the coalition has an unambiguous effect of reducing this ratio: FBA becomes a more effective deterrent to leakage, relative to the Tax case, as the coalition grows larger.
Due to the effect of the export rebate, we also see that full border adjustment has a stronger effect on reducing emissions leakage to noncompliant countries than import adjustments only. 
t t t > > > ).
Proof: The proposition follows from the derivations above (see the proof of the preceding proposition).
To sum up, we have shown that FBA implies lower leakage than all other policies when the coalition cap is fixed. It follows from Lemma 3 that under a fixed global cap, the coalition members' burden share of meeting a certain global emissions target will be lowest under full border adjustments. The intuition is the following: If FBA has lower noncoalition emissions for any given coalition cap, it can relax its corresponding carbon price to meet the global target, which further lowers the emissions differential. The ratio of noncoalition emissions falls due to less price pressure, while the ratio of coalition emissions rises.
Summary of Analytical Results
Carbon pricing induces leakage, and the extent of that leakage depends on the substitutability of traded goods. As the coalition grows larger, the joining country reduces its emissions, but emissions increase in countries that remain outside the coalition. If the carbon price is fixed, emissions also increase in countries already inside the coalition. In the theoretical analysis of anti-leakage measures, we have distinguished between a fixed carbon price, coalition cap, and global cap, and it is useful to keep this distinction when we summarize the results.
With a fixed carbon price, all of the anti-leakage measures mitigate the increase in noncoalition emissions, but coalition emissions are higher than with the carbon price alone.
In terms of the emissions differential, L 2 (as opposed to absolute leakage), we find the same Böhringer, Fischer, and Rosendahl 15 rankings with the fixed price and fixed coalition cap policies, 6 and therefore with the global emissions target. The rankings are shown in Table 1 . between OBR and BAI, however, is more ambiguous: the relative effects of these two policies on coalition emissions (with fixed tax) and noncoalition emissions are hard to assess.
The size of the coalition tends to strengthen the expansion of emissions among nonregulating countries for a given emissions price, while it weakens the emissions reductions within the coalition. An increase in the coalition size does not change the decrease in the emissions differential offered by OBR, but it does influence the relative effectiveness of BAI. For a given coalition emissions cap, the size of the coalition decreases the relative emissions differential under OBR versus a price alone, while the effects of the border adjustment policies are more complex.
Substitution elasticities also play an important role for the effectiveness of antileakage measures. In general, higher elasticities tend to increase carbon leakage. Higher elasticities strengthen the effects of OBR on mitigating leakage, whereas the opposite is the case under BAI. The reason is that the effects of higher consumer prices under BAI are to a larger extent mitigated when cross-price elasticities are increased.
Stylized Numerical Illustrations
Exploring the partly ambiguous implications of anti-leakage measures on output and emissions within and outside an abatement coalition as a function of the coalition size requires numerical analysis even for our simple partial equilibrium framework. Here we focus on the case with a fixed carbon price. Following the theoretical propositions, the tax-alone scenario increases output and thus emissions in the remaining noncoalition countries as the coalition size goes up ( Figure   1 ). 9 Furthermore, the effectiveness of anti-leakage measures increases with the coalition size, with FBA dominating OBR or BAI. The relative performance between OBR and BAI is ambiguous for our parameterization: when the cross-price elasticity is large, the OBR dominates BAI for smaller coalition sizes, but this reverses as the coalition gets sufficiently 7 In the CGE analysis, we consider the case with a fixed global cap on emissions as we aim for empirical evidence on the global cost-effectiveness and region-specific cost implications of alternative unilateral climate policy designs. 8 For example, presumptively eligible industries for anti-leakage measures in H.R. 2454 (House of Representatives 2009) would have at least 5 percent energy intensity (or carbon dioxide intensity at $20/ton); few meet the latter criteria, so a 10 percent cost increase would require a substantial increase-up to 200 percent-in energy costs. 9 Note that with a fixed carbon price, the emissions intensity in coalition countries is fixed across coalition sizes and policy scenarios because it only depends on the carbon price. Thus, the effects on emissions reflect equivalently the effects on output.
big. On the other hand, for lower substitution elasticities, BAI can strictly dominate OBR, while BAI and FBA can cause noncoalition emissions to decrease vis-à-vis benchmark levels.
Anti-leakage measures repatriate output and emissions to countries within the abatement coalition, leading to greater emissions than in the tax-alone case (Figure 2) . If the coalition has global coverage, emissions in the tax-alone and two border-measure scenarios must coincide because there are no longer countries outside the coalition to which border measures could be applied. However, OBR leads to higher output and emissions in this case, a distortion that grows larger as the cross-price elasticity declines.
Total emissions across all countries decrease as the coalition size increases-and more so as the cross-price elasticities shrink (Figure 3 ). We again see that FBA is unambiguously the most effective instrument for reducing global emissions, whereas the ranking between OBR and BAI depends on the coalition size and the substitution elasticity.
The differences between total emissions under FBA and BAI decline as we move toward global coverage, whereas output-based rebate becomes less and less attractive as the coalition grows. At the lower cross-price elasticity, OBR actually increases total emissions relative to the emissions tax. We also notice that the anti-leakage measures, especially FBA and BAI, have largest effects on medium-sized coalitions. This is intuitive: with small coalitions, the effects on global emissions are modest in any case, whereas with small noncoalitions, border measures have limited impacts. The emissions differential (L 2 ), on the other hand, is less sensitive to the substitutability of goods (Figure 4b ). FBA is again the most effective policy, followed by OBR up until a sufficiently large coalition size, at which point BAI is preferred. Both border adjustment policies become more effective at compressing differences in emissions as the coalition size expands.
Applied General Equilibrium Analysis
Our theoretical analysis provides basic insights into important leakage mechanisms and the effectiveness of anti-leakage measures as a function of the abatement coalition size.
But the partial equilibrium framework is highly stylized and misses various real-world features that are important to draw viable policy conclusions. For example, countries are heterogeneous in production and consumption. Economic adjustment to climate policy interference is driven through complex substitution and output effects across multiple markets as well as induced income effects following changes in relative prices of commodities and production factors. In particular, terms-of-trade effects on fossil fuel markets play an important role for leakage. Furthermore, our theoretical framework does not Böhringer, Fischer, and Rosendahl 20 feature a welfare metric that allows for a comprehensive cost-effectiveness comparison across alternative anti-leakage policy measures.
We therefore undertake numerical simulations with a large-scale computable general equilibrium model calibrated to empirical data of global trade and energy use to substantiate our theoretical considerations with quantitative evidence on the performance of anti-leakage policy measures. We first provide a nontechnical summary of the CGE model and its parameterization. We then describe the scenarios to assess the cost-effectiveness of alternative unilateral climate policy regulations as a function of the abatement coalition size.
Finally, we discuss simulation results from which we draw policy-relevant insights for unilateral climate policy design.
Model Structure and Parameterization
Our impact assessment of unilateral carbon abatement strategies builds on a generic In the following, we provide a nontechnical model summary; the detailed algebraic model formulation together with a graphical exposition of the nesting structure in production is given in Appendix B.
The CGE model used for our numerical analysis features a representative agent in each region that receives income from three primary factors: labor, capital, and fossil-fuel resources (coal, gas, and crude oil). Labor and capital are intersectorally mobile within a region but immobile between regions. Fossil-fuel resources are specific to fossil-fuel production sectors in each region. Production of commodities other than primary fossil fuels labor substitution possibilities within the value-added composite, whereas different energy inputs (coal, gas, oil, and electricity) enter the energy composite subject to a CES. In the production of fossil fuels, all inputs except for the sector-specific fossil-fuel resource are aggregated in fixed proportions. This aggregate trades off with the sector-specific fossil-fuel resource at a CES. The latter is calibrated to be generally consistent with empirical estimates for the supply elasticity of the specific fossil fuel. The GTAP database is aggregated toward a composite dataset that accounts for the specific sectoral and regional requirements of our analysis (Table 2) . At the sectoral level, the model captures details on sector-specific differences in factor intensities, degrees of factor substitutability, and price elasticities of output demand to trace the structural change in production that policy interference induces. The model identifies the energy goods coal, crude oil, natural gas, refined oil products, and electricity. This 
Policy Scenarios
To assess the economic appeal of additional anti-leakage measures, we start from a reference scenario Tax, where countries forming the abatement coalition levy a unilateral CO 2 tax. (Equivalently, these countries could establish a joint cap-and-trade system.) We then quantify how economic impacts change as we impose the following supplemental emissionsleakage policy measures for EITE sectors: i) output-based rebates, ii) tariffs on the embodied carbon of EITE goods imported from nonabating regions, and iii) full border adjustments.
The implications of the four climate policy scenarios are measured with respect to business as usual (BAU) in the absence of climate policy action, defined by the economic patterns in 2004, i.e., before the Kyoto Protocol entered into force.
Our main research interest lies in the relative performance of alternative anti-leakage measures as the size of the abatement coalition increases from a single country toward global coverage. Given the fact that among larger industrialized countries, the European Union is pushing most vividly for stringent emission regulations, we take it as the starting point for our Considering that the climate is a global public good, a coherent analysis of antileakage measures requires that we keep global emissions constant for a given coalition size unless we can value the damage from emissions. Acknowledging the huge uncertainties in external cost estimates for climate change, we do not attempt to trade off the cost of emissions abatement with the benefit from avoided climate change but restrain ourselves to a standard cost-effectiveness analysis. Therefore, we require the abatement coalition to adjust its unilateral emissions reduction effort to meet a given global emission cap, which is defined as its unilateral emissions target plus the BAU emissions of the countries outside the coalition. In our core simulations, we set the unilateral emissions target at 80 percent of business-as-usual emissions, but to "compensate" leakage, the effective unilateral cap will be lower. Technically, the global emissions constraint requires an endogenous uniform emissions tax across the countries of the abatement coalition to comply with the exogenous global emissions cap. 11
Numerical Results
Figure 5 illustrates how emissions in three different aggregate noncoalition regions-A1-Rest 12 , BASIC, and ROW-change when the coalition expands and the region in question is still outside the coalition. Each line shows the emissions vis-à-vis BAU levels for a given region and climate policy but with different coalition sizes. For instance, the line "ROW OBR" shows how the ROW emissions change when the coalition expands from no coalition 10 As a matter of fact, the European Union is the only region to date that has adopted legally binding post-Kyoto emissions reduction commitments.
11 If the coalition implements its initial emissions target as an explicit cap,it must be scaled endogenously to compensate leakage toward the exogenous global emissions constraint. In this case, the shadow price of the coalition's cap corresponds to the endogenous carbon tax under price regulation. 12 We refer to the composite of Annex 1 regions without the EU and the US as A1-Rest.
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(BAU) to include the European Union (EU), then also the United States (EU+US), and so on, assuming the use of an output-based rebate to EITE sectors in each of the different coalitions. Economic adjustment costs to emissions constraints are measured in terms of the Hicksian equivalent variation in income, which denotes the amount necessary to add to (or subtract from) the benchmark income of the representative consumer so that she enjoys a utility level equal to the one in the counterfactual policy scenario on the basis of ex-ante Böhringer, Fischer, and Rosendahl 28 relative prices. For global cost-effectiveness assessment, we add up money-metric utility with equal weights across all regions, being agnostic on the distribution of costs. Global compliance costs to achieve a certain global emissions reduction can be lowered if we supplement uniform emissions pricing in coalition countries with additional policy measures to reduce leakage through trade in EITE goods. Figure 7 shows that all anti-leakage measures reduce global compliance costs as long as the coalition is not too big. The basic intuition is that simply replacing production of EITE goods in coalition countries by production of EITE goods in noncoalition countries is cost-inefficient, especially if emissions intensities are higher in noncoalition countries. Figure 8 reports the shift in EITE production from coalition to noncoalition countries while global output of EITE goods declines in all scenarios. It should be noted that global cost savings of anti-leakage policies-measured in percentage of the costs for the tax-alone reference case-decline markedly as the coalition size expands. With respect to absolute cost savings, however, it must be considered that global compliance costs also increase for larger abatement coalitions in the Tax case (see the curve in Figure 7) . Nevertheless, global cost savings fall substantially also in money termsfor instance, expanding the coalition from EU to A1 reduces the cost savings of FBA compared to Tax by two thirds (in the former case, the global cost savings are US$12 billion).
From a broader international policy perspective, the quantitative results raise the critical question of whether the overall economic cost savings through anti-leakage measures will outweigh the risks and efforts of implementation (including legal disputes and potential subsequent trade wars, the costs of monitoring and verifying, and the like). Figure 9 provides a cost-effectiveness assessment for unilateral climate policies from the more narrow perspective of the abatement coalition: what is the minimum cost for the abatement coalition to achieve a given global emissions reduction? Border measures still provide non-negligible cost savings compared to Tax and OBR (particularly for smaller coalition sizes), but the difference between partial and comprehensive border adjustments are smaller than from a global cost-effectiveness perspective. In fact, import tariffs may (slightly) outperform full border adjustments in the simulations because of terms-of-trade effects. The abatement coalition is able to improve its terms of trade via border measures, thereby shifting more of the abatement cost burden to nonabating trading partners. Export rebates on top of import tariffs might be inferior for the abatement coalition if the reduction in EITE export prices to nonabating trading partners dominates the gains from less leakage, which translates into less of an emissions reduction within the coalition. We also notice that OBR is more costly than Tax when the coalition is sufficiently large.
As laid out in , the incidence of unilateral climate policies across different regions may vary substantially. The economic implications from the perspective of a single region capture primary costs of emissions abatement should the country be part of the abatement coalition and indirect international spillover effects through Böhringer, Fischer, and Rosendahl 30 changes of terms of trade. The indirect terms-of-trade effects can be substantial and mainly work through price changes in international energy markets (Böhringer and Rutherford 2002) : the cutback in global demand for coal and crude oil implies a drop in their prices, providing economic gains to fossil-fuel importers and losses to exporters. The terms-of-trade effects on international fuel markets explain most of the welfare impacts for regions outside the abatement coalition and can considerably lower or increase the direct cost of emissions reduction for countries within the abatement coalition. These effects, however, are fairly robust across unilateral abatement policies for a given coalition size because the global emission cap is fixed, and so is the pressure to cut back on fossil fuel consumption. 
Conclusions
Various industrialized countries are in the process of legislating domestic emissions regulations to lead the fight against man-made climate change. A major challenge in the design of unilateral climate policies is the appropriate response to the threat of emissions leakage. Second-best measures such as output-based emissions allocation or border adjustments for energy-intensive and trade-exposed industries can increase effectiveness of unilateral action but introduce distortions of their own.
In this paper, we have assessed the relative attractiveness of politically debated antileakage measures as a function of the abatement coalition size. We find a robust ranking in terms of leakage reduction and global cost-effectiveness with full border adjustment coming first, followed by import tariffs, and then output-based rebates. The differences across anti- This statement involves three specific assumptions: Assumption 1c says that as we increase the carbon price t, demand for domestically produced goods in regulating countries will fall even if imported goods from nonregulating countries are taxed through border adjustments. This assumption will be a sufficient but not a necessary condition for clear comparisons. It is simple to show that (0) 0 ψ ′ < . Thus, we effectively consider carbon prices and abatement costs within a reasonable range in which the first-term effect dominates the second.
Assumption 1c: Let
Lemma 2: In the case of a fixed coalition cap, the ranking of L 1 across policies will follow the ranking of L 2 .
Proof: With a fixed coalition cap,
, for any two policies j and k. Then and vice-versa) . 
. Furthermore, with less leakage pressure, 
which implies that to meet the same coalition target, a lower carbon price is needed with full border adjustment than with output-based rebates.
Next, with F R p p < and Lemma 1b, we have
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Appendix B . Algebraic Summary of the Computable General Equilibrium Model
The computable general equilibrium model is formulated as a system of nonlinear inequalities. The inequalities correspond to the two classes of conditions associated with a general equilibrium: (i) exhaustion of product (zero profit) conditions for producers with constant returns to scale; and (ii) market clearance for all goods and factors. The former class determines activity levels, and the latter determines price levels. In equilibrium, each variable is linked to one inequality condition: an activity level to an exhaustion of product constraint and a commodity price to a market clearance condition.
In our algebraic exposition, the notation z ir Π is used to denote the unit profit function (calculated as the difference between unit revenue and unit cost) for production with constant returns to scale of sector i in region r, where z is the name assigned to the associated production activity. Differentiating the unit profit function with respect to input and output prices provides compensated demand and supply coefficients (Hotelling's lemma), which appear subsequently in the market clearance conditions. We use g as an index comprising all sectors/commodities i (g=i), the final consumption composite (g=C), the public good composite (g=G), and investment composite (g=I). The index r (aliased with s) denotes regions. The index EG represents the subset of energy goods coal, oil, gas, electricity, and the label FF denotes the subset of fossil fuels coal, oil, gas. Tables B1-B6 explain the notations for variables and parameters employed within our algebraic exposition. Figures B1-B3 provide a graphical exposition of the production structure. Numerically, the model is implemented in GAMS (Brooke et al. 1996) and solved using PATH (Dirkse and Ferris 1995) .
Zero Profit Conditions:
1. Production of goods except fossil fuels (g∉FF): 
2. Sector-specific material aggregate: 
5. Production of fossil fuels (g∈FF):
Aggregate imports across import regions: 
